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STATUTES
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10(6) (1953)
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10, 11

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred on the Utah Court of
Appeals by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(3).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This

interlocutory

appeal

is

from

an

order

granting

Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, entered by the Honorable
Joseph I. Dimick, Fourth Circuit Court Judge of the Provo Circuit,
State of Utah.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Whether properly gathered police evidence can be suppressed

where the defendant claims police interference precluded her from
securing an independent chemical test as permitted by UTAH CODE
ANN. § 41-6-44.10(6)?
II.

Whether properly

gathered

evidence can be suppressed

in

contravention of the clear and plain reading of UTAH CODE ANN. §
41-6-44.10(6), which clearly states that failure of the accused to
secure an independent test cannot affect the admissibility of
police evidence?

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
A reproduction of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 in its entirety
is set forth in the addendum, pursuant to the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals 24(a)(6) and 24(f).
In relevant part, the code states:
(a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have
a physician of his choice administer a chemical test in
addition to the test or tests administered at the
direction of the peace officer.
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional
test does not affect admissibility of the results of the
test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer,
or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the
direction of a peace officer.
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test
or tests administered at the direction of a peace
officer.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 14, 1989, the Defendant Mary Werner was arrested
by Provo City police officers for driving under the influence.
(Transcript at 25) .

She was asked to submit to a breath test,

which she refused, requesting a urine sample instead. She was then
informed, under Utah's Implied Consent Law, that: one, she might
lose her driver's license if she did not submit to the test; and
two, she had the right to obtain an independent test administered
by a physician of her choice. (Id. at 30) .

Consequently, Ms.

Werner relented and submitted to the Intoxilyzer test. (Id.)

The

Defendant then renewed her demand for a urine sample. (Id.)

The

Defendant was given a urine sample bottle, and a private restroom
was made available for her use.(Id.)

The Defendant then took the

bottle, and of her own volition secured a sample for analysis. (Id.
at 26). Upon release, the Defendant took the sample to the Utah
Valley Regional Medical Center for testing.

The Hospital refused

to test the urine sample claiming that the chain of custody was
disputable. (Id. at 26) . Consequently, at the suppression hearing,
the Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the Intoxilyzer
breath test.

The trial court found that the Defendant was made

aware of her right to a physician-administered test, and that the
police did not act in bad faith to frustrate her right to an
independent test. (Ruling, Appendix). However, the court held that
the police's response to the Defendant's request for an individual
test did not provide the Defendant with a reasonable opportunity
to exercise that right, which the trial court held amounted to a
3

denial of due process• (Ruling, Appendix)•
court granted the motion to suppress.

Consequently,

the

The City appeals from that

decision of the trial court,
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Appellee has failed to show by clear and convincing
evidence that she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity for an
independent test.
surrounding

her

Based on the totality of the circumstances

arrest

for driving under

the

influence, the

Appellee lacks a factual basis on which to claim that the police
interfered with her right to an independent test.

The facts of

this case demonstrate that the Appellee was on notice that she was
to secure her own test, which she failed to do.

Furthermore, the

Appellee knew her rights, and her dereliction in guarding those
rights is not a sufficient basis for suppression of the City's
evidence.
Likewise, the City is not responsible for the acts of a third
party which acts caused the Appellee's inability to secure her
independent test. The plain meaning of Utah's implied consent law
does not allow for the suppression of properly secured evidence,
where the defendant's inability to secure an independent test is
the result of conduct outside of the City's control.
clear

on this point, and public policy

demands

The law is
that

it be

implemented as it is written, in order to curb the destructive
effects of driving under the influence.
In addition, the Appellee's claim that her inability to secure
a second test precluded her from presenting evidence material to
4

her

case

fails,

since

constitutionally material.

the

Appellee's

evidence

was

not

Her evidence did not possess any

exculpatory evidence before its destruction, consequently, we are
left to speculate as to its value, and pure speculation does not
satisfy any constitutional materiality test.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

THE SUPPRESSION, BY THE CIRCUIT COURT, OF A PROPERLY SECURED
CHEMICAL TEST, IS IMPROPER AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE
NEITHER STATUTE, CASE LAW OR THE FACTS AFFORDS A PROPER BASIS
FOR THE SUPPRESSION.
The Appellee claims that the Provo City Police interfered with

her right to a second chemical test under Utah's Implied Consent
law, therefore denying her a reasonable opportunity to secure an
independent test. This claim cannot be substantiated either under
the facts or the law.

It is Provo City's contention that the

responsibility for obtaining a second test rested with the Appellee
at all times, and the mere fact that a police officer gave her a
bottle to secure her own test should not render the City's evidence
inadmissible. Utah's Implied Consent law is clear and plain on its
face, as it applies to this set of facts.

The appellee did not

secure a second test, and her failure or inability to secure a
second

test cannot affect the admissibility

of Provo

City's

evidence.
A.

A Reasonable Opportunity to Secure An Independent Test
Depends Upon The Facts Of Each Case, And Must Be Shown
By Clear And Convincing Evidence, Which Has Not Been
Shown In This Case.

The Appellee cites several cases where courts have held
prosecution evidence inadmissible because the alleged violator was
5

denied a reasonable opportunity to obtain a second test.

The

Appellee relies on these cases as a basis for rendering Provo
City's evidence inadmissible. However, this reliance is misplaced.
Factually, the cases on which the Appellee bases her argument are
distinguishable from the case at bar.

A brief summation of those

cases underlines their distinct factual differences: People v.
Underwood, 153 Mich.App. 598, 396 N.W.2d 443
1986)(Denial

of

reasonable

opportunity

for

(Mich. Ct. App.
second

test when

officers convinced accused that second test was "silly and stupid",
and would show higher blood alcohol level); Fairfax v. Smith, 330
S.E.2d 290, (S.C. 1985)(Reasonable opportunity to second test
frustrated

where

officer,

over

accused's

objection,

seized

independent blood sample and refused to allow hospital to test, but
sent the sample to police testing facility); State v. Hilditch, 3 6
Or.App. 497, 584 P.2d 376 (Or. Ct. App. 1978)(Accused returned to
jail, after hospital refused test until accused could pay; Officer
knew accused's wife was en route with money when officer returned
him to jail); State v. Dressier, 433 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. Ct. App.
1988)(Frustration of reasonable opportunity for independent test
where officer refused to take accused to hospital of his choice,
but took accused to another hospital 23 miles distant). The common
thread running through each of these cases is the high level of
police interference in the accused's right to a second test.

In

these cases, based on a factual analysis, the evidence was either
suppressed or admitted, depending on the level of police hindrance
which was shown to exist.

Consequently, in cases such as these,
6

the facts become the key ingredient in determining whether a
reasonable opportunity for an independent test was frustrated.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, in Bilbrey v. State,
531 So.2d

27, 30

(Ala. Crim. App.

1987),

declared

that an

"appellant must demonstrate that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the police conduct was unreasonable by clear and
convincing evidence in order to establish a due process violation."
Therefore, according to this Alabama Court, a factual analysis is
paramount

to

determining

whether

the

accused's right to an independent test.

police

have

denied

an

In Bilbrey, the Court

found no police interference, hence no due process violation, where
the officer refused to take the accused to a hospital for an
independent test. There was no clear and convincing evidence that
due

process

had

been

denied.

If

this

"totality

of

the

circumstances" test, as used by the Alabama court, is applied to
the Appellee's situation, Provo City's evidence should not have
been suppressed.
The facts, as revealed by the suppression hearing transcript,
demonstrate that the Appellee was given a reasonable opportunity
to obtain an independent test. Officer West, one of the arresting
officers, testified that he, or Corporal Nisson, told the Appellee
that "we have a urine bottle, we can certainly give that to you and
you can obtain your own sample, and have it analyzed it [sic]
wherever you wish." (Transcript at 30) . The Appellee was on notice
that this was her "own sample" and that she must have it analyzed
whenever and wherever she choose.
7

From that moment on, the

Appellee was responsible to ensure that she followed the proper
procedure for securing her independent test.

Unfortunately, the

trial judge and Appellee's counsel have massaged the facts in a
manner at odds with the testimony presented at the suppression
hearing.

According to the trial court's ruling, upon which

Appellee's counsel relies, the Appellee went into the restroom,
obtained a urine sample, and then "stopped the vile with other
materials provided by the police." (Appendix, Ruling, Paragraph 6) .
This statement implies that the police were more actively involved
than

the

actual

testimony

reveals.

Besides

the

officer's

testimony, as to the giving of the bottle to the Appellee for her
own test, the trial court itself queried the Appellee's counsel as
to the sequence of events. The colloquy between the court and the
Appellee's counsel is as follows:
THE COURT:

You're saying they gave her a vial—

MR. PETRO:

Yup.

THE COURT:

— l e t her use it and let her cork it?

MR. PETRO:

No.

They just gave her a vial and didnxt

give her any more instructions than that.
(Transcript at 27) .

This bit of testimony further substantiates

Provo City's claim that the bottle given to the Appellee was for
her "own" test. Likewise, this testimony evinces a diminished role
of the police in this matter.

As Officer West testified, the

Appellee was given the bottle for her "own" test, and the police
involvement in the process terminated with this act. There was no
evidence presented indicating the level of interference suggested
8

by the trial court in its ruling.

See also State v. Hayes, 700

P. 2d 959, 962 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) ("Due process requires only that
the police give a person accused of driving under the influence a
x

reasonable opportunity to attempt to procure a timely sample,*

through his own efforts and at his own expense."); State v.
Russell, 704 P.2d 1215 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
1.

The Appellee is not an innocent party and
presumed to know her rights under the law.

is

The Appellee would have this Court believe that she was an
innocent party, disadvantaged by her reliance on the police.
facts tell a different story.

The

The Appellee, after receiving an

explanation of her Miranda rights, twice requested to speak with
her attorney, Mr. Petro. (Appendix, DUI Form; Transcript at 50)
Furthermore, the Appellee was well aware of the law concerning DUI
arrests, as she immediately, upon request of the officer that she
take a breath test, requested a urine test. (Appendix, DUI Form).
These facts illustrate that the Appellee was well aware of her
rights under the law.

If the Appellee was in doubt as to the

proper procedure to follow, she could have phoned her attorney or
anyone else for clarification.

Consequently, with respect to the

preservation of breath samples and the concerns of due process,
Justice

01Conner

has

stated,

that

"the

failure

to

employ

alternative methods of testing blood-alcohol concentrations is of
no due process concern, both because persons are presumed to know
their rights under the law and because the existence of tests not
used in no way affects the fundamental fairness of the conviction
actually obtained." California v. Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479, 492
9

(1984)(Emphasis added).
rights

and

should

As the facts show, the Appellee knew her

not be able to have

the

City's

evidence

suppressed on the contrived notion that she was misled.
B.

The Inability Of The Appellee To Secure An Independent
Test Was The Result of Actions By A Party Independent Of
The Police And The Appellee.

The Oregon Court of Appeals, interpreting Oregon's Implied
Consent law, stated that "xinability' to obtain a test refers to
the situation where, for some reason independent of the conduct of
either the arrestee or the police, such as loss of the blood sample
by the hospital performing the test, an independent chemical
analysis cannot be obtained." State v. Hilditch. 36 Or.App. 497,
584 P.2d 376, 377 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).

See also State v. Dressier,

433 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. Ct. App. 1989).

This case, now before the

bar, reflects the perfect example of where independent conduct
outside of the City's sphere of control has caused the Appellee's
sample to lose its evidentiary value. The refusal of Utah Valley
Hospital to examine the Appellee's urine sample squares completely
with the Oregon Court of Appeal's definition of "inability".

The

hospital, as an independent actor, frustrated the Appellee's chance
at a second test.
suppressed

under

Provo City's evidence should not have been
any

44.10(6)(b) (1953).

application

of UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 41-6-

The "inability" of the Appellee to secure an

independent test does not preclude the prosecution from using
properly secured evidence against the accused. UTAH CODE ANN. § 416-44.10(6)(b).
It cannot be argued that ruling in Provo City's favor would
10

strike one more arrow from the accused's quiver.

This is not the

case. By overruling the trial court, this court would be affirming
the proper interpretation of Utah's Implied Consent law. That is,
when independent parties interfere with an accused's right to a
second test, it is not a denial of a reasonable opportunity for
that test.

Such a ruling conforms with the proper meaning and

construction of the statute as passed by the Utah Legislature,
wherein the legislature declared that the "failure or inability to
obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of the
results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace
officer . . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10(6)(b).

Vacating the

trial court's suppression order would also be a reaffirmation of
public policy against driving under the influence of intoxicants
to which this state has committed substantial resources in an
effort to curb the destructive effects of such criminal conduct.
C.

Due Process Issues Concerning Constitutionally Material
Evidence Apply Equally to Evidence Either Preserved By
The Prosecution Or Secured By An Accused. Appellee's
Evidence, Secured Through Her Own Efforts Is Not
Constitutionally Material, And Therefore, The City's
Evidence Should Not Have Been Suppressed.

Appellee's

brief

attempts

to

distinguish

California

v.

Trombetta. 467 U.S. 97 (1984) and other cases cited by the City in
its original brief by categorizing those cases as pertaining only
to exculpatory

evidence preserved by the City.

incorrect assumption.

This

is an

The Washington Supreme Court in State v.

Stannard, 742 P.2d 1244 (Wash. 1987), after discussing

Trombetta,

declared that the constitutional materiality standard of Trombetta
applied equally to evidence secured by the defendant as well as to
11

that preserved by the prosecution.
Factually, the Stannard case arose out of three different
cases where the defendants relied on their interpretation of
Washington's implied consent law. This law, RCW 46.61.506, allows
the arrestee to secure an independent test from any "qualified
person". Id. at 1247.

Each of the three defendants interpreted

this wording to mean that the arresting officer could administer
the second test.

In each case the officer refused, and no second

test was secured by the defendants. Appeals followed from adverse
rulings as to the defendants' motions to suppress, on the theory
that the defendants' due process rights had been denied.
RCW 46.61.506(5) is similar to Utah's statute in that it
provides that the "failure or inability to obtain an additional
test by a person shall not preclude the admission of evidence
relating to the test or tests taken at the direction of a law
enforcement officer." Stannard, 742 P.2d at 1247.

The Court went

on to explain that the "statutory scheme provides that reasonable
opportunity by permitting the accused to secure outside tests. "
Id. at 1248.

It was then held that the officers were under no

statutory duty to give the defendants a second test.Id.
The Court then addressed the due process issue.

The Court

held that the defendants have the right to material evidence
preserved for use at trial.Id.

However, the Court also explained

that to merit the due process clause guarantees, the evidence to
be preserved must meet the standard of materiality as set out in
Trombetta.

In other words, the evidence "must both (1) possess an
12

exculpatory

value that was apparent before the evidence was

destroyed, and (2) must be of such a nature that the evidence would
be unobtainable by other reasonably available means." Id. at 1249.
Citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984); United States
v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).

Although the Trombetta case dealt

with constitutionally material evidence to be preserved by the
prosecution, the Washington Supreme declared that "[t]he principles
stated in regard to the preservation of evidence for the defense
of an accused apply equally to the securing of evidence by an
accused."

Finally, the Court held that

[e]vidence must be shown to be both material and exculpatory
in order for it to be fundamentally unfair to deny defendant
the opportunity to present it in his defense. There is no
showing that any of the defendants were prevented from seeking
and securing an alternative test as provided under RCW
46.61.506. Further, it has not been shown that the securing
of a second breathalyzer test would have been exculpatory.
Id. at 1249.
Clearly, the Washington Supreme Court's ruling is plain in
its meaning.

Whether the destroyed evidence was to be preserved

by the prosecution or secured by the defendant, that evidence must
meet the constitutional standard of materiality before the loss of
such evidence can affect due process.

In the case at bar, the

evidence at issue was that to be secured by the Appellee, but the
issue of constitutional materiality still applies under the holding
of Stannard.

The evidence the Appellee claims was lost must have

possessed an exculpatory value before its destruction, and must
have been unobtainable by other reasonable means.

Both prongs of

this test must be satisfied, and if the Appellee fails to satisfy
13

either of the prongs, her evidence cannot be constitutionally
material.

Consequently,

constitutionally

if

material,

the Appellee's
the

City's

evidence

evidence

is not

cannot

be

suppressed. State v. Stannard, 742 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Wash. 1987);
California v. Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479, 466-67, (1984).
The Appellee has failed to satisfy either of the prongs of the
constitutional materiality test.

As to the first of the prongs,

the apparent exculpatory nature of the evidence before it was
destroyed, it is extremely unlikely that the Appellee's urine
sample could have fulfilled this requirement.

This reasoning is

based on the fact that the arresting officer's DUI report form
reveals that the Appellee failed the field tests administered to
her, and that she was abusive in her behavior toward the officers.
(DUI Report Form, Appendix).

Her speech, according to the report

was "slurred, loud & continual" and, according to the officer, she
had a "strong" odor of alcohol about her.

This evidence, coupled

with the Intoxilizer results of .13, casts a long shadow of doubt
over any possible exculpatory value of the Appellee's independent
test.
1.

Evidence which is cumulative, speculative, or has
little more than a mere possibility of exculpatory
value, cannot be considered
constitutionally
material.

The Washington Supreme Court explained that
evidence which is merely cumulative cannot be material.
Further, the evidence has to be shown to have been exculpatory
in order to meet the constitutional standard of materiality.
At best, whether the results of a second test would be
exculpatory or incriminating can be no more than speculative
and, therefore, of questionable assistance to the defendant.
14

Stannard, 742 P.2d 1249. (Emphasis added.)

Accordingly,

cumulative or speculative evidence can never be constitutionally
material.

The

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

arrived

at

the

same

conclusions in State v. Jimenez, 761 P. 2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) .
In Jimenezf the Court was asked to consider whether the erasure of
a videotape, which supposedly recorded the alleged assault by the
accused on a police officer, was material to her case. Id. at 577.
The defendant, after her arrest on a DUI charge, allegedly kicked
an officer during the booking process. Id. at 578.
was charged for this assault.

The defendant

Before trial the videotape, which

may have recorded the event, was erased, according to established
procedure under which such tapes are recycled if no specific
request has been made for their retention. Id. The defendant made
a motion to suppress on the grounds that the tape was material to
her defense.

The trial court dismissed the charge on the basis

that the State failed to retain the videotape. The State appealed
that decision.
This Court, in addressing the constitutional materiality of
the defendant's evidence, declared that
[constitutional materiality requires that there be a showing
that the suppressed or destroyed evidence is vital to the
issues of whether the defendant is guilty of the charge and
whether there is a fundamental unfairness that requires the
Court to set aside the defendant's conviction. A corollary
of this proposition is , *The mere possibility that an item
of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or
might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not
establish materiality in the constitutional sense.'
Jimenez, 761 P.2d at 578-9, citing State v. Nebeker. 657 P. 2d 1359,
1363 (Utah 1983) (Court's emphasis) . The Court then held that since
15

Jiminez had failed to show that a videotape had been made, or if
made, whether or not it contained relevant evidence, the trial
court erred in dismissing the charges. Id. at 579.

The Court

concluded that
we are left to speculate on whether any * evidence1 was
destroyed.
If evidence was destroyed, its materiality—
x
evidentiary' or *constitutional1—cannot be determined. All
defendant has is a mere possibility that there was something
recorded which might have helped her defense.
Id. Accordingly, mere speculation as to the existence of evidence
is insufficient to pass muster under the constitutional materiality
standard.
Likewise, City's properly secured evidence has been suppressed
under the guise of pure speculation.

The trial court in this

instance erred in suppressing the City's evidence, just as the
trial court did in Jimenez by dismissing the charge. The Appellee
is laboring under a "mere possibility" that her evidence was
exculpatory, and therefore constitutionally material to her case.
The facts surrounding the Appellee's arrest do not support her
contention that an independent test would have produced exculpatory
evidence.

We are left with nothing more than speculation, which

speculation is insufficient to meet the constitutional standard of
materiality
evidence.

necessary

to

require

suppression

of

the

City's

A suppression order, on what might have been, is an

unjustifiable ruling and should be overturned by this court.

16

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant respectfully
requests that the Suppression Order of the Fourth Circuit Court be
vacated.
Dated this 23 day of November 1990.

Vernon F. (Rick) Romney
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APPENDIX

R U L I N G

In this matter this Court is being asked by the Defendant to
suppress the result of a breath test administered by the police to the
defendant pursuant to the arrest of the defendant on driving under the
influence charges•
Based on the evidence presented by the parties at an evidentary hearing
on the motion, the Court makes the following findings of fact*
1.

On the fourteenth day of November, 1989 the defendant was

arrested by the Provo police-and brought to the police department
where she was requested to submit to a breath test.
2.

At first the defendant declined, saying she had no confidence

in the breath testing process and asked for a urine test.
3.

The police read to the defendant the provisions of the "implied

consent law" including her right to an independant test whereupon she
consented to the breath test, and gave it, all the while advising that she
also intended to have an independant test.
4.

After the breath test was completed the defendant inquired again

about the independant test.
5.

The police officer who had custody of the defendant responded by

handing the defendant a vile and saying to her that he thought she could
keep a urine sample in the vile and have it tested later.
6.

The defendant took the vile into a restroom, unattended, placed

a sample of her urine in it and stopped the vile with other materials
provided by the police.
7.

The vile was not sealed, or marked in any fashion.

8.

The defendant, when released, took the vile to a local hospital

and requested that they analize it.
9.

The hospital eventually decline to do so, noting in a letter to

the defendant that the vile had not been sealed, marked and lacked the
necessary chaine of evidence.
The defendant does not claim that she did not receive notice of her
right to an independant test nor is there anything in the evidence from
which this Court could conclude that the police acted in bad faith or
intentionally to frustrate an independant test.

The City, in response to the motion primarily relies on the provision
of section 41-6-44.1006) (a) and (b) which provides for the independant
test and there in paragraph (b) reads: "(b) The failure or inability to
obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of the results
of the test taken at the direction of a peace officer..."
This Court however rejects the notion that the above cited provisions
address themselves to wider circumstances than "••.the failure or inability
(of the defendant) to obtain the additional test...", and is silent with
respect to what the remedy may be when the failure results, at least in
part, from police conduct.
It seems clear that if the failure to obtain an independant test
does stem from police actions that such failure may well amount to a
denial of due process and the appropriate sanition or remedy may well
be the suppression of the result of the governments test notwithstanding
the statute.
Therefore the issue becomes one of deciding if the police response to
the defendant Ts request for an independant test provided a reasonable
opportunity to effectively exercise that right.
Most of the cases dealing with these questions have turned on extremely
different facts, such as whether the police frustrated the test, or gave
notice of a right to it, or had some duty to provide affirmative assistance ir
obtaining the test.
Not so here.

In this case the police clearly gave notice of the right,

followed by a suggestion as to how the defendant might proceed and there
provided the materials to undertake the effort.
So the question presented here is more one of if the police do
undertake to give assistance to procure a test; must it have some reasonable
chance of success.
Clearly, the urine sample taken by the defendant could never have
been admitted into evidence under the rules of evidence.

There could never

have been an adequate foundation laid.
It is also clear that the police response amounted to giving advice which
the defendant followed.
After considering all of the above this Court finds that the police did
not provide a reasonable opportunity to the defendant to effectively exercise
her right to an independant test and that such conduct did act to deny the

defendant due process of law.
Accordingly the defendants motion to suppress is granted.
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The following admonition was given by me to the subject
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which
is civil in nature and~separate from the criminal charges. YourTight to remain silent does not give you
the right to refuseto take the test. You do nor have the right to have counsel during the test procedure.
Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, I will consider that you have refused to take the test.
I warn you that if you refuse to take the test, your driver's Ircense can be revoked for one year with
no provision for a limited license.
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OTHER OCCURRENCES OR FACTS:

XIII.

ATTACHED DOCUMENTS:
I have attached the following documents to this report
1. 9"£bpy of citation/temporary license
2. D Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit
3. D Traffic accident report *
4. D Other documents (specify)

I hereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer anrfthat theanformation contamerf above rn this report form and attached
documents is true and correct ttrmy knowledge and belief and thaf this report form was prepared in the regular course of my
duties. It is my belief the subject was in violation ofsection 41-6-44 U £ A at the date, time, anrf place specified in this report.

Signature ofS*eace
ofS»eace Olpcer,
O^fcer,
Law Enforcement Agency

A

At

A ^

r >4 »

Date:.

The original of this form roust.be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to:
Driver License Division
4501 South 2*00- West
P.O. Box 30560
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560

